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THE MORAL CONSENSUS
| Title: |
The Moral Consensus: An Essay Concerning Identity, Freedom, And Responsibility |
| Author: |
David J Larkin |
| Subject: |
Philosophy—Ethics |
| Publisher: |
David J Larkin, Melbourne 2004
Copyright © David J Larkin, 2003
All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process without the written permission of the publisher.
Copyright enquiries: David J Larkin
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| Notes: |
Includes index and bibliography |
| ISBN: |
0 9757118 0 6 |
| Keywords: |
Morality, consensus, identity, existential determinism, determinism, free-will, freedom, responsibility. |
| Contents: |
Introduction
Personal Identity and Existential Connectedness
Existential Determinism
Freedom of Action
Moral Responsibility
Consensus and the Fundamental Tenet
The State and Freedom of Information
The Social Contract
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| Links: |
The Moral Consensus
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INTRODUCTION
•Let me commence by stating what this essay is not. It is not a definitive expose on the subject of ethics or the socio-political implications of that discipline—which should be clear from the brevity of the work's proportions.
Its brevity, or conciseness, or lack of verbiage is in part an acknowledgement of the reader's familiarity with the content and an invitation to the reader to bring to that content their own experience and reflection without the distraction of 'exhaustive', often esoteric, literature reviews.
And in part, its brevity represents a considered refusal to engage the often obscure, extreme, sophistic, or superstitious proclamations, and self-serving proselytizing rhetoric of the 'usual suspects'; a refusal to 'engage' but not an urging to ignore such conviction or to deny the right to its expression.
The intent of this essay is to underscore the paramount status of the individual in society and to outline a criterion upon which the community's obligation to the individual, in the context of a limited capacity to satisfy competing demands, can be founded and subsequently elaborated.
The essay commences with an examination of several meta-ethical issues, namely, identity, causality, freedom, and responsibility before considering the normative issues of consensus and mutual obligation.
The existential connectedness of prior states of being is critical to the notion of identity, in particular, the persistence of identity. Existential connectedness is simply the chronicle or narrative of the changing profiles of an individual or entity through time.
And the importance of existential connectedness, in this context, is the implication it has for the notion of existential determinism and consequently, the issue of freedom, and responsibility.
Existential determinism asserts that appropriated or assimilated antecedent-causes are essential elements of identity, that is, integral defining qualities of an evolving being rather than extraneous influences of external agency. That is, antecedents, once appropriated, cease to be extraneous. Consequently, this notion gives meaning to the concept of freedom of action without subverting the concept of causation.
The issue of moral responsibility presupposes a moral code, a moral consensus: a dynamic between the desires of the individual and the needs of the community. The normative analysis examines this requirement in the context of a fundamental tenet, namely, that no one individual or group of individuals has the right to imperil the sanctity of another (individual being) in either mind or body.
The fundamental tenet, as an ideal against which the actions or decisions of an individual or the community must be measured, however, requires supplementation. In addition to the tenet, what is required is the goodwill of natural disposition or the goodwill that issues from the rational recognition of the pragmatic value of co-operation.
In order to facilitate and evaluate this measured co-operation we need to clearly found the nature and extent of mutual obligation: the obligation of the individual to the community, and the obligation of the community to the individual. To this end, the processes of government must be transparent, transparently accountable, and subject to ongoing review.
And both the Opposition and the Media must be empowered. In particular, the Media must be balanced, independent (free of proprietorial or political interference) and extensively uncensored, independently regulated, and (of course) accountable to community standards and expectation.
META-ETHICAL CHAPTER ABSTRACTS AND POINTS OF CONJECTURE
PERSONAL IDENTITY AND EXISTENTIAL CONNECTEDNESS
•Physical connectedness is a prerequisite for 'sameness' or the persistence of identity of a cognitive or non-cognitive entity; and physical connectedness is simply the existential connectedness (chronicle or narrative) of the disparate or changing physical profiles of the cognitive or non-cognitive entity under consideration.
Psychological connectedness may be similarly positioned depending upon the particular philosophical disposition or interpretation the reader assigns to 'mental states' or psyche. What is critical to the notion of identity is the existential connectedness of prior states to the current profile—cognitive or non-cognitive entity, physical or psychological profile.
•••
And the relevance of existential connectedness in the elucidation of identity bears not simply upon issues (for example) that pertain to the establishment of a foundation for the 'administration of justice'. In this essay, the importance of existential connectedness is the implication it has for the notion of existential determinism and consequently, the issue of freedom.
EXISTENTIAL DETERMINISM
•The concept of connectedness within identity appears to be misunderstood or ignored in the examination of issues pertaining to free will and determinism. Existential determinism recognises that antecedents are essential to identity, that is, integral to 'who we are'—defining factors integral to our 'being'—rather than extraneous influences or characteristics of an 'external agency'.
•••
If 'we' choose, are we blameworthy or praiseworthy, indeed are we responsible? If we perpetrate a particular action, we are indeed responsible in at least a simplistic sense, but whether we should be held accountable, praised, or reviled would depend (in part) upon whether we were 'free' to act.
FREEDOM OF ACTION
•We have freedom of action (or choice) when we are unconstrained in the pursuit of our desires. What 'conditions' our desire is a measure of our state of being: of 'who we are', our physiological and psychological state.
When we act, we act upon our (prevailing) desire. Since we act upon our desire, we act 'freely'. If we act 'freely' we are responsible for our actions and are, therefore, worthy of praise or blame.
•••
Notwithstanding that we are responsible for our actions, we need to be ever mindful of extraneous conditioning factors such as (for example) disease or indoctrination. Mindful, not for the purpose of abrogating responsibility, but for mitigating or 'measuring' remedy—after all, that we care is a measure of our humanity. However, if we are responsible for our actions are we 'morally responsible'?
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
•A morally significant act is simply an act that has a moral consequence, that is, an outcome or action that can be deemed morally right or morally wrong. 'Moral consequence', of course, implies the existence of a moral code that prescribes (implicitly or explicitly) the accepted 'terms and conditions' and expectations of conduct.
A morally responsible act is, simply, an act of moral consequence that complies with the moral code. Conversely, a morally irresponsible act is an act of moral consequence that does not comply with the moral code. Therefore, if an individual acts in compliance with the moral code then their action is deemed morally responsible. If their action is not compliant then their action is deemed morally irresponsible.
SECTION SUMMARY
•Existential connectedness (the chronicle or narrative of experience) is critical to the notion of identity. The concept of connectedness within identity appears to be misunderstood or ignored in the examination of issues pertaining to free will and determinism.
Existential determinism recognises that antecedents are essential to identity, that is, integral to 'who we are'—defining factors integral to our 'being'—rather than extraneous influences or characteristics of an 'external agency'. Appropriated antecedents condition our desire—our desire is a measure of our state of being: of 'who we are'. When we act, we act upon our (prevailing) desire.
Since we act upon our desire, we act 'freely'. If we act 'freely' we are responsible for our actions and are, therefore, worthy of praise or blame. And if we act within the moral code, our action is morally responsible.
NORMATIVE-ETHICS CHAPTER ABSTRACTS AND POINTS OF CONJECTURE
CONSENSUS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL TENET
•If morality is the 'dynamic' between the desires of the individual and the needs of the community then a moral act is simply an act that is consistent with the terms and conditions of that dynamic: the moral consensus.
Furthermore, if we assert (by postulate) that no one individual nor group of individuals has the right to imperil the sanctity of another (individual being) in either mind or body then any individual or group of individuals who do so imperil another, is guilty of a crime against humanity: the fundamental tenet, the fundamental right.
However, the fundamental tenet is merely an ideal against which an individual should measure their desire and against which a community should measure its decisions. Therefore, what is needed, in addition to the tenet, is the goodwill of 'natural disposition' or the goodwill that issues from the (rational) recognition of the pragmatic value of co-operation.
Mistakes, however, will be made. And in order to identify and remedy these mistakes, as well as acts of incompetence or corruption, the 'actions' of the community must be transparent, transparently accountable, and subject to ongoing evaluation.
THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
•Sovereignty is a 'matter of consensus' that occasions an obligation or expectation of responsibility and an expectation of benefit—in a local, regional, or global context. In an environment of competing demands and limited capacity, the (dynamic) obligation is often thwarted or confused.
Therefore, in order to subvert, or at least minimise, the impact or occurrence of both deliberate and inadvertent transgressions of obligation, the processes of government must be transparent, transparently accountable, and subject to ongoing evaluation.
Furthermore, in order to provide the necessary timely and efficacious analysis of government performance, the Opposition and the media must be empowered—the Opposition and the media must be 'informed'. And the media must be balanced, independent and 'uncensored', independently regulated, and (of course) accountable to community standards and expectation.
•••
Community standards and expectations that must, in turn, be subject to evaluation and, where required, to reform. These standards, of course, must be reflected in or advanced by the 'social contract' between individuals, 'interest groups', and the instruments of government.
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
•That which brings happiness and pleasure would surely be considered 'good'. What is 'right' is that we ought to pursue and facilitate desire and its fulfillment. And the only constraint upon action should be the primary clause of the social contract: the fundamental tenet, the fundamental right.
•••
Notwithstanding this precept, any departure, any action of compromise instituted by the community, in order to sustain itself, must be mediated by the fundamental tenet; tempered by the omnipresence of uncertainty, unreliable perception, flawed reasoning and judgement; and tolerant of mistakes whilst vigilant against incompetence and corruption.
Implicit within the social contract is the obligation of the individual, of interest groups, and the instruments of government to the fundamental tenet. In the context of compromise, it is the responsibility of all protagonists to maximise the greatest good to the individual—a new utilitarianism, perhaps.
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